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The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare:
Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World
By JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, RICHARD A. BRECHER, AND TATSUO HATTA*

(1954), who did extend the positive analysis
to include tariffs, did not go on to ask
whether immiserization of the transfer recipient (and hence symmetrically enrichment of
the donor in a two-country model) could
now arise consistent with market stability.
Recently, the welfare analysis of transfers
has been extended in two different directions, both apparently unconnected, and both
yielding the conclusion that transfers from
abroad can be immiserizing (and that the
donor may improve its welfare) despite
market stability. One route to this conclusion
has been the introduction of a third economic agent (or country) that is outside of
the transfer process. In the Appendix of his
1960 paper analyzing the interaction between
trade policy and income distribution, Harry
Johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor-income classes (capital and labor) in an
open economy, thereby providing what can
be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which
donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different
factor. 1 An independent analysis of the
three-agent transfer problem, using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods
and fixed coefficients in consumption, was
also undertaken in an important paper by
David Gale (1974). 2 Brecher and Bhagwati

Paul Samuelson's (1952, 1954) classic
papers on the transfer problem addressed
two separate analytical issues: the "positive"
effect of a transfer on the terms of trade; and
the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor
and the recipient.
Since then, a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis.
While Samuelson (1954) himself had extended the 2 X 2 X 2 free trade analysis to
allow for tariffs and transport costs, subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions
of the model: for example, to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in Samuelson
(1971); or general nontraded goods in John
Chipman (1974) and Ronald Jones (1970,
1975).
Remarkably, however, the welfare analysis
of transfers has not paralleled these developments. Since Wassily Leontief (1936) produced an example of immiserizing transfer
from abroad and Samuelson (1947) argued
that the example required market instability,
the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 X 2 X 2 model in its free trade version
cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the
donor as long as world markets are stable (in
the Walras sense). Interestingly, Samuelson
*Bhagwati: Department of Economics, Columbia
University, New York, NY 10027; Brecher: Department
of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON KIS
5B6: Hatta: Department of Political Economy, The
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218. We
thank the National Science Foundation, grant no. 524718, for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper. The paper was written when Brecher
and Hatta were visiting Columbia University, 1981-82.
Gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and
suggestions from John Chipman, Avinash Doot, Jacques
Dreze, Robert Feenstra, Jacob Frenkel, Ronald Jones,
Murray Kemp, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Mussa, John
Riley, Lars Svensson, and Robert Willig, from anonymous referees, and from seminar participants at Berkeley, Harvard, Minnesota, Rochester, Chicago and the
University of California-Los Angeles.

1
After the present paper was submitted for publication, and following its presentation at Rochester, our
attention was drawn to this Appendix, which was noticed by a student of Ronald Jones. Subsequently, we
learned from Makoto Y ano that Motoshige Itoh had
pointed out an important related paper by Ryuotaro
Komiya and T. Shizuki (1967), whose condition (11) for
the Johnson case anticipated our equation (12) below.
We are grateful for having both of these references
brought to our attention.
2
Gale constructs an example in which the donor 1s
enriched along with the recipient. Furthermore, this
immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis-
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(1981) also independently pioneered this
analysis in the context of a three-agent model
where the recipient country is split into one
subset of "national" factors and another of
"foreign" factors, and the conditions for the
immiserization of the national factors after
receiving a transfer from abroad are analyzed
and shown explicitly to be consistent with
market stability.
Another route has been to consider
transfers in the presence of exogenously
specified domestic distortions. Thus, Brecher
and Bhagwati (1982) have analyzed the case
of a transfer in the presence of a production
distortion in the recipient country and shown
that the recipient can get immiserized despite
market stability if the recipient's "overproduced" good is inferior in the donor's consumption. Hatta, in an early unpublished
paper (1973a), has also demonstrated for a
closed economy with constant-cost production that a transfer between two agents, when
there is a distortionary wedge between producer and consumer prices, could immiserize
the recipient consistent with market stability.
Peter Diamond ( 1978) has also recently considered the welfare impact of transfers when
a price distortion exists in an economy with
convex technology, and he gives comparative-static results that are consistent with
paradoxes.
This recent proliferation of paradoxical
cases of immiserizing transfers (and enriching transfer payments) is reminiscent of the
earlier multiplication of cases involving immiserizing growth, with Bhagwati's (1958)
analysis of the case of a large country in free
trade being followed by Harry Johnson's
(1967) analysis of the case of a small country
erize the (new) recipient. A simple calculation, moreover, shows that the Gale example is Walras-stable.
Gale's work has stimulated a number of papers, most of
which assume fixed commodity endowments and/or
fixed consumption coefficients. A notable exception is
an analysis of the three-agent transfer problem by
Makoto Yano (1981), who introduces substitutability in
both production and consumption. (We are grateful to
Ronald Jones and Peter Neary for drawing our attention
to Y ano's work, after the research for the present paper
was virtually completed.) A fuller discussion of these
and related papers, in an evidently growing and important literature, is provided by us (1982b) elsewhere.
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with a tariff. 3 The latter proliferation led to
the generalized theory of immiserizing growth
(Bhagwati, 1968b) whose major, influential
proposition is that growth, in the presence of
a distortion implying departure from full
optimality, can be immiserizing since the
primary gain from growth at optimal policies
may be outweighed by an accentuation of
the loss from the distortion vis-a-vis the optimal policies.
Can a similar, striking generalization be
developed in regard to the transfer-induced
paradoxes? It is the general conclusion of
our analysis in this paper that, indeed, it can.
We demonstrate that the phenomenon of
immiserizing transfers from abroad (and the
analytically symmetric phenomenon of enriching transfer payments) in the presence of
market stability can arise only if there is a
distortion characterizing the economy in
question.
This general conclusion is critically dependent on our demonstration below that the
three-agent case, which appears prima facie
to involve no distortion while producing the
noted paradoxes, is indeed characterized by
what Bhagwati ( 1971) has called a foreign
distortion, since the country is not using an
optimal tariff. Moreover, the exercise of their
joint monopoly power by the recipient and
donor (viewed as members of a customs
union) vis-a-vis the nonparticipant agent will
be shown to eliminate the paradoxes in question.
Thus, in Section I, we develop the basic
analysis of transfers when there are two economic agents (countries) engaged in the
transfer process, but there is an added agent
outside the transfer process so that we have a
bilateral transfer in a multilateral context.
Conditions are established for immiserization of the recipient, for enrichment of the
donor and for the "double perversity" when
these two paradoxical outcomes arise simultaneously. Economically intuitive explanations of these results are derived in a number
of alternative ways.
3
Robert Aumann and B. Peleg (1974) have rediscovered, in a restrictive model with no substitution in
production, the immiserizing growth case of Bhagwati
(1958). See also Bhagwati (1982).
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In Section II, yet further intuition on these
results, in consonance with the theory of
immiserizing growth, is arrived at, and suitable geometry of the three-agent transfer
problem is simultaneously developed. Importantly, the role of inferiority in consumption or inelastic foreign demand is
established in making feasible the perverse
outcomes, which are shown to involve a foreign distortion (correctable by a uniform optimal tariff policy applied jointly by the
donor and the recipient against the nonparticipant). In tum, this establishes an interesting parallel between the conditions for the
immiserizing-transfer paradox in the threeagent, foreign-distortion case and the conditions established in Bhagwati's (1958) immiserizing-growth case which also involves a
similar foreign distortion (i.e., growth for a
large country that is failing to use an optimal
tariff because of its free trade policy).
Section III then presents the implications
of our results for some important theoretical
and policy problems in both international
and closed-economy contexts.

1981.) Each country produces and consumes
two goods, X and Y. Free trade and perfect
competition prevail.
Now, suppose that country a makes a
transfer to country y. Country f1 does not
participate in the transfer process. We will
call a the donor, y the recipient, and fJ the
nonparticipant "outside" country. The objective of the analysis will be to determine the
effect of the transfer on the welfare levels of
the three countries.
The following notation will be used in
presenting our model:
q = the relative price of good X,
u' = the welfare level of country i,
T= the value of the transfer in terms
of good Y,
e'(q, u')= the expenditure function of country i,
r'(q)= the revenue function of country i,
x'(q, u')= the compensated import-demand
function for good X by country i,
for i = a, {1, y.
We then define an overspending function c'
as follows:

I. Transfers with Three Agents:
Model and Analysis

We begin with a formal analysis of the
three-agent transfer problem, drawing on duality theory in terms of compensated demand functions, which have been introduced
into the welfare-theoretic analysis of international trade by Hatta (1973b, 1977), Hatta
and Takashi Fukushima (1979), and most
notably and comprehensively by Avinash
Dixit and V. Norman (1980), although earlier
applications such as indirect utility functions
are to be found also in the work of Chipman
(1972).

SEPTEMBER 1983

i=a,{1,y.

Evidently, the value of this overspending
function represents the difference between
the expenditure necessary to achieve the utility level u' when the goods-price ratio is q
and the revenue of the producers of country i
at the same price ratio. Thus, c' is the amount
of added revenue (i.e., transfer income) that
is necessary for this country to sustain u'
when the price ratio is q.
Using this notation, we can write our
model as follows:

(1)

ca(q,ua)+T=O,

A. TheModel

(2)

c.B(q,u.B)=O,

Consider a world economy consisting of
three countries: a, {1, and y. (While the analysis is couched in terms of three countries, it
is applicable immediately to a closed-economy context with three agents within the
economy, or to a two-country international
economy where one country is disaggregated
into two groups as in Brecher-Bhagwati,

(3)

c'Y(q,u'Y)-T=O,

(4)

xa(q,u )+x.B(q,u.B)+x-Y(q,u'Y)=O.
0

This model of four equations contains four
variables: u u.B, u'Y, and q. Equations (1)-(3)
are the budget equations for the respective
countries, while equation (4) is the market
0

,
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equilibrium condition for good X. (In view
of W alras' Law, the market-clearing equation
for good Y has been omitted.)

B. Comparative Statics
We now examine the impact of an exogenous increase in T upon the variables of the
model above. Throughout the paper, subscripts always indicate partial differentiation
with respect to a particular variable; for example, c: acaI aua and xJ axY/ aq. The
following theorem can now be derived.

=

=

THEOREM 1: Assume ( without loss of generality) that e: = ee = eJ = 1 initially; and let
6. fJx"x"u + xf1x/Ju + xYxYu - x q' where x q x"q
+ xq + x;. Then

=

=

(5)

dq/dT= (x:-x:)/6.,

(6)

du"/dT= [xq-xP(x~-xZ)]/a,

(7)

duf1/dT= - [xP(x: - x:)]/6.,

(8) duY/dT=-[xq-xP(x~-x:)]/a.
PROOF:
Taking the total differential of (1) through
(4), applying the assumptions of the theorem,
and using the well-known property that c~ =
x' (for i = a, /3, y ), we obtain

1

0

0

0
0

1

0

0
xPu

1

x"
x/J
xY

Xy
u

xq

x"u

I~·
dufJ
duY

-1

=

0
1

dT.

0

dq

Applying Cramer's Rule to this system and
taking notice of (4), we immediately obtain
the theorem.
It is readily shown that 6. equals (minus)
the slope of the general equilibrium, excessdemand schedule of good X for the world as
a whole. 4 Thus, the Marshall-Lerner condi4

First use equations (]), (2), and (3) to write u" =
= vfl( q) and u Y = vY( q,
respectively
Then define x"[q, v"(q, T)] + x [q, vfl(q)] +
v"( q, T), ufl

T),
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tion for (Walrasian) stability implies that
6.>0.
Note also that equations (5) and (7) yield
duf1/dT>O if and only if -xPdq/dT>O.
Thus, the welfare of the country not involved
in the transfer improves if and only if the
price of its export good goes up as a result of
the transfer-as is indeed immediately evident.
C. Paradoxes: Enrichment of Donor and
lmmiserization of Recipient

The welfare impacts of a transfer upon the
donor and the recipient, however, are not as
simple as this. In the remainder of this section, therefore, we will give various interpretations of Theorem 1, to shed more light on
the conditions under which the paradoxes of
immiserized recipient and enriched donor
arise. Note immediately, however, that if
either xP = 0 or (x~ - xD = 0, that is, if
either /3 's net trade is zero or /3 and y share
an identical marginal propensity to consume
X, 5 the second term in the numerator of the
right-hand side of (6) is zero. In this case,
equation (6) reduces to dua/dT = xq/6.,
which is, of course, the familiar expression
for the welfare effect on the donor in the
two-country analysis. With 6. > 0 and xq < 0,
du"/dT must be negative, that is, the donor
must be imrniserized. When the only trade
partner of the donor is the recipient, or when
the recipient and the nonparticipant share an
identical marginal propensity, therefore, the
welfare impact on the donor is as if we were
in a two-country world, and the donor
paradox never arises. A symmetric conclusion can be derived for the welfare effect on
the recipient from equation (8).
Generally, however, the second term in the
numerator of the right-hand side of (6) or (8)
= x(q, T), which is the world's uncompensated excess-demand function for good X. Now,
- Xq"+ XuVq
""+ Xqfl+ XuVq
fl fl+ XqY+ XuVq
Y YWe h ave x• xY[q, vY(q, T)]

1

-x"x:-x xe-x 1xJ+Xq=-t..
5

As may be readily verified, the marginal propensity
to consume good X in country 1 equals qx~/ e~ for
i = a, /3, y. Therefore, if /3 and y share an identical
marginal propensity to consume X, this implies that
x: = x~ (recalling the normalization that e~ = ee = e~
= I).

Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
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can cause paradoxical welfare effects, and we
have the following necessary conditions for
the paradoxes:

(9)

dua > 0 implies that xP(x/J -

dT

~~

u

x-r)
<0
u
'

< 0 implies that xP( xe - x:) < 0.

In fact, (6) and (8) make it clear that when
xq = 0 (i.e., when substitution effects are assumed away), the second inequalities in (9)
and (10) are not merely necessary but also
sufficient conditions for the paradoxes. And
it is equally clear that if xq is sufficiently
negative (i.e., if X and Y are readily substitutable in production and consumption), the
paradoxes are unlikely to occur. 6

D. Decomposition of Welfare Changes
In further understanding our results in
Theorem 1, note first that the right-hand
sides of (6)-(8) contain the x~ terms for all
countries i ( = a, /3, y ), except for the one
whose welfare is stated by the equation in
question. Let us now examine why this curious fact holds; it leads us into an insightful
way of looking at our results. 7
For this purpose we may conceptually
decompose the transfer from a to y into two
stages. At the first stage, a gives transfers to
both /3 and y in profortion to their initial
import demand for X. At the second stage, /3
6 This might explain why Gale (1974), who tried to
construct an example of donor enrichment, wound up
assuming fixed coefficients in consumption (with fixed
coefficients in production also implied by his exchange
model), and confessed his inability to admit "smooth
preferences." Interestingly, the absence of smooth preferences also characterizes the examples that Gale attributes to other major mathematical economists such as
Drezi: and McFadden. Just recently, Daniel Leonard
and Richard Manning ( 1982) provided a paradoxical
example involving smooth preferences within an exchange model.
7
In Section II and in fn. 15 below, we spell out an
alternative way of seeing why the income terms of only
the two "other" countries appear in equations (6) and
(8).
8
That is, when a gives out a transfer of one unit of Y,
f1 receives xfl/( xfl + x Y) units of Y and y receives
xY/(xfl+xY) units of Y. If these ratios are positive,

SEPTEMBER 1983

gives y what it received from a in the first
stage, with the final situation ending up
therefore as equivalent to the actual transfer
going exclusively from a to y. The welfare
effect on the donor a can then be decomposed into two effects corresponding to these
two stages.
Rewriting (6), we have 9

Now it is possible to show that the first stage
leads to the first term on the right-hand side
of (11). 10 Making transfers to every other
country in the world economy in proportion
to its initial import demand for X is therefore tantamount to making a transfer to the
other country in a two-country context! This
process therefore results in a negatively
signed term; the paradox of donor enrichment cannot come from this stage.
On the other hand, the second stage leads
to the second term on the right-hand side of
( 11 ). 11 The sign of this term depends exclu-

both countries receive positive amounts of transfer. If
xfl/(x/J + xY) is negative, /1 receives a negative transfer,
viz, it gives a transfer of - xfl/( xfl + x Y) to a. In this
situation, y receives one plus - xfl/(xfl + xY) units of
Y, since xY/(xfl + xY) = 1- xfl/(x/J + xY). Similarly, y
gives a positive transfer to a when xY/(x/J + xY) is
negative.
9 The reader can similarly rewrite (8) for the welfare
effect on the recipient, y.
10
To see this, appropriately exploit the essence of the
result in (6). A unit transfer from a to {J implies

and from a to y implies

With actual transfers in the first stage divided according
to the ratios xfl/(xfl + xY) and xY/(xfl + xY) between f1
and y, these ratios should be multiplied into (a) and (b),
respectively. Adding the resulting equations yields xq/A..
11 This readily follows from appropriate}t: using the
essence of the result in (7) and the fact that x /(xfl + xY)
represents the share of the transfer /J received at the first
stage and hands out to y in the second stage. Equation

sively on the direction of the price change
caused by the second-stage transfer. We already know from (9) that xfl(xe - xD < 0 is
a necessary condition for the paradox of
donor enrichment, and why this occurs is
readily seen from (11) and the second-stage
argumentation.
E. Alternative Necessary Conditions
for Paradoxes

We now tum to an alternative, equally
insightful way of looking at Theorem 1. We
first establish a set of necessary conditions
for the paradoxes of donor enrichment and
recipient immiserization. Then, it will be
shown how these conditions are also necessary for price amplification effects which
further help to explain the paradoxical possibilities.
Take again the case of donor welfare, and
apply the Slutsky equation to (6) to get 12

(12)

du"
dT

( X"
q

+ xYq + xflq + xf1x-r)
u

a

where xf1(q) is the uncompensated importdemand function for country {3. Now, given
A > 0, and assuming throughout the rest of
this section without loss of generality that
xfl < 0 (i.e., country f3 exports good X), we
see immediately that the donor can be enriched only if either xi< 0, or
> 0, or
both. That is, if a transfer enriches donor a,
then either X is an inferior good to the
recipient y or the offer curve of the nonparticipant outside country /3 is inelastic (such
that the export supply of X by f3 falls as the
relative price of X rises).
Similarly, for the immiserization of the
recipient, we must have du 1/ dT < 0, and this

x:

(7) applies since, when fJ makes a transfer to y, the
welfare effect on a is as if a is the nonparticipant,
outside country; the resulting welfare impact on a per
uni I transfer from fJ to y is

12

Substituting
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x: = x:- x xe

xq = x; + x: + xJ

11

can be shown to imply that either x~ < 0 or
> 0 or both.
To understand more fully why these conditions are necessary for the paradox of (say)
donor enrichment, the Slutsky equation and
(4) may be used straightforwardly to rewrite
the stability condition as A= x"(x~ - xi)x"q - x q1 -(xf1q + xf1xY)
>.
0 If (xflq + xflxY)
u
u >
0-which can happen only if either
> 0 or
xi < 0 (given still that xfl < 0)- d will be
smaller than in the two-country case (in
which x: = xfl = 0), ceteris paribus. Therefore, the price change measured by equation
(5) is amplified by the presence of the third
(nonparticipant) country {3. If this priceamplification effect applies to an improvement in the terms of trade for a, the donor
may be paradoxically enriched by the transfer, even though the (smaller) terms-of-trade
improvement in the two-country case cannot
be great enough for the paradox of donor
enrichment. By similar reasoning, 13 if f3 's
offer curve is inelastic or good X is inferior
for a, an amplified deterioration in y 's terms
of trade may be great enough for the paradox of recipient immiserization.
These necessary conditions for an international transfer paradox are, interestingly,
analogous to those established by Bhagwati
(1958) for immiserization due to domestic
growth (in the form of factor-endowment
expansion or technological improvement). As
he showed, the paradoxical possibility of immiserizing growth requires that either growth
be ultra-biased against production of the importable (i.e., the importable be an "inferior"
good in production) or the foreign offer curve
be inelastic. This analogy suggests immediately that, if immiserizing growth paradoxes are attributable to the presence of
distortions, as shown in Bhagwati (1968b), it
should be possible to interpret the present
transfer analysis in the three-agent context
also as one where the paradoxes of immiserized recipient and enriched donor arise only
when a distortion is present. The distortion

x:

x:

13
1n this case, the Slutsky equation and (4) should be
used to rewrite the stability condition as

into (6) and recalling

yields (12).

Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
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here, as in Bhagwati (1958), must again arise
as a foreign distortion in the sense of Bhagwati (1971); that is, the failure to exploit
monopoly power in trade. Indeed, this can
be demonstrated, as in Section II below.

SEPTEMBER 1983

>-c,
0

0
(!)

II. Viewing Three-Agent Paradoxes as
Resulting from Foreign Distortion

We now proceed to demonstrate that the
perverse welfare responses to bilateral transfers in the multilateral framework of three
agents are attributable to the presence of a
foreign distortion, and that the introduction
of a suitable optimal tariff that eliminates
this distortion will rule out the paradoxes.
We first demonstrate this geometrically, using
a technique that is suitable for "large" (as
well as "small") transfers.
A. The Geometry of the Free Trade Case

We begin by illustrating in Figure 1 the
possibility of a perverse welfare response to
bilateral transfer in the three-agent case. For
convenience of exposition without loss of
generality, the diagram treats countries a
and y as partners of a customs union engaged in (free) trade with country fJ. (This
treatment takes on more than expositional
importance in Part B below, when a and y
uniformly impose an optimal tariff policy
against fJ.) In the initial pretransfer equilibrium, the union produces on its production-possibility frontier QyQx at point Q,
consumes on its Scitovsky (1942) frontier
SySx at point S, and trades with country fJ
from point Q to point S along the price line
QS. 14 To avoid cluttering the diagram, we
have not drawn country fJ 's offer curve,
which starts at point Q and passes through
point S. For the sake of concreteness only,
let country fJ be again an exporter of commodity X (i.e., xfl < 0) while country a imports this good (with xa > 0).
Now, with country a making a transfer to
country y, suppose that the former's terms of
14

For further details on the use of production-possibility and Scitovsky frontiers corresponding to a pair of
countries involved directly in a bilateral transfer, see
Brecher and Bhagwati ( 1982).

··™······························...,·····-~•.•.•······-····-·· .........

FIGURE I

trade consequently improve because the
marginal propensity to consume good Xis
greater for country a than for its union
partner. Figure 1 illustrates the borderline
case in which the terms-of-trade improvement is exactly enough to leave country a's
welfare unchanged, despite the transfer. The
union shifts in production to point Q' on
curve QyQx, and moves in consumption
to point S' on curve s;s~, which is another
Scitovsky frontier in the map corresponding
to a constant level of country a's welfare.
Country fJ 's offer curve (still not drawn)
now starts at point Q' and passes through
point S'.
In Figure 1 as drawn, good X is clearly
inferior for the union as a whole. This inferiority, moreover, must characterize country y
in particular, since country a 's welfare is
constant throughout the entire Scitovsky
map. By contrast, no such inferiority would
be implied if curve s;s~ were redrawn to
touch line Q'S' at pomt S" (lying east of
point S), while country {J's offer curve (not
shown) were redrawn to pass through point
S" when starting at point Q'. In this alternative case, however, the offer curve of country
fJ must be inelastic, because a deterioration
in this country's terms of trade is now associated with a rise in exports to the union.
(These two alternative conditions are, of
course, those already established in Section I,

"Copyngnffl2001AfflghtsF<eserved='
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Part E, above for the paradox of donor enrichment.)
By similar reasoning, an actual rise in
country a's welfare, in response to a transfer
to country y, might occur provided that either
good Xis inferior in the latter country or the
offer curve of country /3 is inelastic. This
paradoxical possibility would occur in Figure
1 if country /3 's offer curve (not drawn) were
respecified to cross line Q'S' southeast of the
consumption point S' (or alternatively S")
after starting at the production point Q'. In
this case, after the transfer, there would remain a world excess supply of good X if q
fell only enough to leave u" constant at the
initial (pretransfer) level. Thus, given stability, country a 's terms of trade would ultimately have to improve still further, thereby
leading to the paradox of donor enrichment. 15
Essentially the same argument shows that
country y might incur a welfare loss from
15
1n determining whether there remains a world excess supply of good X when q is adJusted to keep ua
constant after the transfer, clearly the substitution effect
but not the income effect plays a role in (the
unchanged-welfare) country a, whereas both of these
effects are relevant in countries /1 (as ufl varies with q)
and y (as uY varies between Scitovsky frontiers). Thus,
we have additional insight into why the income effects
xe and xJ but not xi enter the necessary condition (9).
Similar reasoning sheds extra light on ( 10)
Two further remarks are in order. First, the use of
the Scitovsky technique to analyze welfare changes here
is only a natural counterpart to the two-stage derivation
technique used by trade theorists m positive analyses.
Thus, if the impact of a parametric change on the terms
of trade is analyzed, one can hold the terms of trade
constant, compute excess demand for one of the two
goods, and then use the stability condition to determine
the direction of the terms-of-trade change, a procedure
introduced by Johnson, Mundell, and many other trade
theorists in the l 950's. Identically, if one is interested
instead in welfare change (of say the donor), one can
equally hold welfare (of the donor) constant, compute
excess demand, use the stability condition to determine
the terms-of-trade change and then immediately the
welfare change. This was, in fact, the procedure utilized
in the analysis of immiserizing growth in Bhagwati
(1958); and for the transfer problem, it leads naturally
to the resurrection of the Scitovsky curves, as in the text
above. Second, the use of Scitovsky curves in analyzing
the transfer paradoxes was introduced earlier in Brecher
and Bhagwati (1982). Whereas our Scitovsky technique
easily handles large changes, the use of the two-stage
holding-welfare-constant technique for small changes
has also been introduced in Yano (1981) who credits
Ronald Jones for the idea.
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receiving the transfer, provided that either
good Xis inferior in country a, or (as before)
the offer curve of country /3 is inelastic. If
the required conditions for a perverse response in welfare hold simultaneously for
both partners of the union, the transfer from
country a to country y could raise the
former's welfare and lower the latter's, implying a double perversity of outcomes.

B. Optimal Tariff Against a
Nonparticipant Country

Consider now the following alternative
ways of demonstrating how the use of an
optimal tariff by the union rules out the
paradoxes at issue.
I. A Geometric Analysis. Consider the extension of the preceding analysis to the case
where the union of a and y always maintains
a uniform, optimal tariff vis-a-vis {3, the
nonparticipant country. Thus, for each value
of the domestic goods-price ratio in Figure 2,
the union adjusts the tariff to set the worldprice ratio at the level consistent with the
Robert Baldwin (1948) envelope BE, given
the union's production-possibility frontier
Q yQx and the offer curve QG of country {3.
To avoid cluttering the diagram, we have
drawn this offer curve with its origin in only
one of the many possible positions. Alternatively, if this origin were placed at point Q'
(instead of Q) for example, the offer curve
would touch curve BE at point S' (rather
than S). Following a common convention,
tariff revenues collected by each union member are returned to its consumers in lump
sum fashion.
This optimal-tariff policy must result in
the union consuming along its Baldwin
envelope BE of Figure 2 in equilibrium. Initially, the union produces on its productionpossibility frontier QxQx at point Q,
consumes on its Scitovsky frontier SySx at
point S, trades with country /3 along the
external-price line QS from point Q to point
S, and imposes a tariff to create the proportional wedge between this price line and the
(parallel) domestic-price lines (not drawn)
tangent to curve Q yQx at point Q and to
curve SySx at point S.
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could establish that the recipient, y, cannot
be immiserized .
It follows, therefore, that the paradoxes of
donor enrichment and recipient immiserization cannot arise if the union of the donor
and the recipient follows the policy of adopting an optimal tariff that equates their
domestic rates of (producer) transformation
and (consumer) substitution to the foreign
rate of transformation, such that DRSa =
DRS 1 = DRTa = DRT 1 = FRT. Under free
trade, however, the paradoxes become possible since the situation suffers from a foreign
distortion such that DRSa = DRS 1 = DRT"

>-

..,
0
0

"

=DRTY-=1=FRT.
FIGURE 2

Now let the transfer take place from country a to country -y, and imagine what would
hypothetically happen if the domestic relative price of good X within the union fell
exactly enough to leave the donor country
a 's welfare constant, despite the transfer.
Under these circumstances, the union would
move to point Q' in production, trade along
the external-price line Q'S" with the rest of
the world, and plan to consume at point S"
on the Scitovsky frontier s;1s;1 drawn for the
initial level of country a 's welfare. (For
well-known reasons, the slope of curve s;'s;'
at point S" equals the union's internal product-price ratio, given by the common slope
of curves Q yQx and BE at points Q' and S',
respectively.) In this way, an excess demand
(represented by the length S'S") for good X
for the world as a whole would necessarily
emerge, 16 and the relative price of this good
would have to rise to clear world markets
under stable conditions.
This implies that country a, the donor,
cannot enjoy enrichment since the initial fall
in the price of X which exactly offset the
primary loss from the transfer would now be
reduced, leaving a worse off. Similarly, we
16 Note that point S" in consumption must lie outside
the curve BE, assuming that good Y is not sufficiently
inferior to violate the Vanek ( 1965)-Bhagwati ( l 968a)Kemp (1968) condition (discussed in more detail by us
elsewhere, 1982a) for stability in the presence of tariffs.
See also fn. 17 below.

2. Algebraic Analysis: The preceding geometric analysis immediately suggests an approach to a formal proof of the proposition
that the union of a and y, utilizing an optimal tariff against /3, would not admit of the
paradoxes in question. Thus we should be
able to show that, if such a tariff were in
place, the paradoxes would be ruled out.
This can indeed be done as follows.
Utilizing the model so far, we now distinguish between q as the domestic relative
price of X and p as the external price. Then,
we write the foreign offer-curve function as
xfl(p). Now, define the function p by

(13)

p(q,p) = (q- p)[-xP(p)].

If q and p take on their equilibrium values,
then p ( q, p) gives the tariff revenue of the
union of a and y. Also, let p*(q) represent
the value of p that maximizes p( q, p ), given
q, and define the function p* by

{14)

p*(q)=p[q,p*(q)].

Now, if the international market is in equilibrium with p = p*( q ), so that p ( q, p) takes
on its maximized value p*( q) for the prevailing q, then it can be readily observed that the
union must be operating on its Baldwin envelope at the point where FRT equals that q.
In this case, therefore, q - p*(q) is equal to
the union's optimal tariff rate. Of course,
there is no a priori guarantee that any arbitrary q and the correspondingp*(q) are equilibrium values; in general, they are not. But
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BHAGWATI ET AL.: TRANSFERS AND WELFARE

VOL. 73 NO. 4

the observation above implies that if the
union always sets the tariff rate equal to
q - p*(q) for the prevailing q, then this rate
coincides with the optimal tariff rate when
equilibrium is reached. The following result
can now be established.

LEMMA 1: If p = p*(q), then (q- p)x: =
-fi
X.
PROOF:
Recalling that the optimal tariff maximizes
p given q, we have ap[q, p*(q)]/ap = 0, from
which the lemma follows immediately.
Now, reformulate the model of this paper
to allow for the union always imposing the
tariff rate q - p*(q). Also assume that countries a and y collect tariff revenues equal to
(q - p*(q)]xa(q, ua) and [q - p*(q)]
xY(q, uY), respectively. (Thus, we implicitly
assume that both union members import
good X from country /:3, although the results
of the analysis would be essentially unaffected if one member received all of the tariff
revenues because the partner imported nothing from f:3.) The overspending functions ca
and c-r are now given by

{15) ca(q,ua)=ea(q,ua)-ra(q)

615

THEOREM 2: If (17)-(19) hold and (by
normalization) initially e: = eJ = 1, then

(20)
(21)

(22)

duY/dT= -x'/t:l'cacr
q
u u,

where tl.' = - x q1 +(caxa;ca)+(cYxY/cY)
quu
q u u and
Xtq = Xaq + xfip*
p q + Xyq•

PROOF:
Taking the total differential of (17)-(19),
we get
0

ci lldua
duY

Cy
u

ca

xYu

x~

dq

l l- l
=

l1 dT.

0

We thus obtain
(23)

c-r)x-r]
[cYx'
u q -(ca+
q
q
u

dua
dT

tl.1c:cJ

From (15) and (16), we get

-[q- p*(q)]x"(q, ua),
(16)

cY(q,u 1 )=e-r(q,u 1 )-rY(q)
-[q- p*(q)]x-r(q, u-r).

Then, our full revised model is given by
(17)

ca(q, ua)+ T= 0,

(18)

cY(q,uY)-T=0,

(19)

and

cJ=l-(q- p*)xJ.

Thus, we have
(24)

[cu1 x q -(c"q + c-r)x-r]
q
u
1

xa( q' ua) + xfi [ p*( q)]

+ xY(q, uY) = 0.
This three-equation model has three variables: ua, uY and q.
The following theorem can be derived.

where the last expression follows from
Lemma 1 and equation (19). Substituting
(24) into (23) immediately yields (21 ). The
other equations in Theorem 2 are derived
similarly.
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It is evident then from (21) and (22) that,
with l::!.'c:c~ > 0 owing to market stability, 17
and with x~ < 0, 18 we necessarily get du''/ dT
< 0 and du / dT > 0. That is, the donor must
be immiserized and the recipient must be
enriched. Paradoxes cannot arise.

PROPOSITION: The paradoxes of enriched
donor and immiserized recipient cannot arise
unless a distortion is present in the system.

3. A General Proposition. Now that we have
demonstrated that the pursuit of an optimal
tariff policy by the (union of the) donor and
recipient jointly vis-a-vis the nonparticipant
agent will rule out transfer paradoxes, in a
W alras-stable context, we are able to see that
the presence of a suitably interpreted (foreign)
distortion is required in the three-agent case
if the paradoxes are to arise. 19 At the same
time, for the case of two agents, we know
that exogenously imposed price distortions
(for example, tax-cum-subsidies on production, consumption or trade) can also generate the transfer paradoxes (in the presence of
inferior goods), as established by Brecher
and Bhagwati (1982) and ourselves (1982a).
We also know from the former paper, which
analyzes transfer-induced distortions in the
context of additionality requirements, and
from the latter paper which analyses transfer-seeking DUP activities by domestic and
foreign lobbyists, that endogenous (i.e., transfer-induced) distortions can also generate
transfer paradoxes, consistent with Walrasian stability. We can therefore now state the
following general proposition:

The foregoing analysis has important implications in a number of areas of theoretical
and policy concern.
International: (i) Our analysis of the
three-agent problem does modify the earlier
theoretical presumption against the possibility of stability-compatible paradoxes. ( ii)
Since, in the international context, reparations and aid are never given by one country
to the "rest of the world," but are always
bilateral transactions in a multilateral context, policymakers should be alert to the
possibility that their intentions may be
frustrated by paradoxical outcomes. ( iii) As
noted by Brecher and Bhagwati (1981), the
three-agent transfer problem has an immediate counterpart in the analysis of customs unions with full mobility of factors
within the union. Thus, for instance, it is
possible for Italy to be immiserized within
the EEC by receiving an aid inflow from the
non-EEC world, under conditions established by us, consistent with market stability.
Domestic: (i) Internal redistribution
from the rich to the poor may also be counterproductive under the conditions established here. Thus, if the poor receive the
transfer from the rich while the not-so-poor
outside group is a net exporter of food and
the rich also have a lower marginal propensity to consume food than the not-sopoor, then we know that the conditions are
satisfied to make it possible for the poor to
be immiserized by receipt of the transfer. (ii)
The three-agent analysis also brings into
sharp focus problems raised by the "basic
needs" prescription that the targeted poor be
given purchasing power to buy their nourishment et al. If this purchasing power is taken
from the rich, the nonparticipant not-so-poor
may well find that their real income is diminished by a transfer-induced deterioration
in their terms of trade (under an appropriate
ranking of marginal propensities to consume), so that the poor become not-so-poor

x~,

17
By reasoning similar to that of fn. 4 above, fl'=
where x1(q, T) = xa[q, va(q, T)] + .xll[p*(q)] +
xY[q, 11Y(q, T)], while the indirect utility functions 11a
and 11Y now come respectively from equations (17) and
( 18). Thus, Walrasian stability requires that O < fl'. Also,
as explained by us elsewhere (1982a), c: and cJ must
both be positive to satisfy the Vanek-Bhagwati-Kemp
condition assumed in fn. 16 above.
18As we move along the Baldwin envelope,
>0
and
< 0 are well-known properties of economic efficiency. Thus, x; +
+ xJ < 0.
19
While our analysis can be viewed therefore as
essentially providing a conceptual way of integrating the
many-agent problem into the theory of distortions and
welfare, our result on optimal tariffs also has direct
policy relevance. For example, if there are two income
classes, rich and poor, in an open economy with monopoly power in trade, we can definitely assert now that,
if an optimal tariff is always in place, redistribution
from the rich to the poor will not lead to paradoxical
results.

x:

p;

x:p;

III. Conclusion: Implications for Analytical
and Policy Problems
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whereas the not-so-poor are reduced to the
ranks of the poor! Indeed, our three-agent
analysis similarly implies a certain caution in
treating famine relief through transfers of
purchasing power to the distressed income
groups. Unless a similar security net is available elsewhere, you may then be pushing the
malnourished not-so-obviously-starving poor
(who are not receiving this purchasing power)
below the line so that they are now ravaged
by the famine.
The Invisible Shakedown: Our analysis
also suggests a generalization of the idea
underlying Gale's (1974) example where both
the donor and the recipient are enriched by a
transfer, at the expense of the nonparticipant
outside agent. What is implied here is a
seemingly innocuous process that involves
enrichment at the expense of an unsuspecting agent. Through this process, the outside
agent is hurt, for the benefit of the transferprocess agents, in a fashion that is by no
means perceived as such, unlike in overt and
visible instances such as where an optimal
tariff may be levied against that agent.
Gale's example is, however, only one such
instance: where the transfer is between the
two agents ( a and y) with the third agent
(/J) remaining outside of the transfer process. But it is easy to see that one of the two
agents (say a) could equally exploit the third
agent (/J) by making a direct transfer to it,
immiserizing it while enriching itself (and
even, if need be, the other agent, y ): the
conditions for this being readily established
from equations {6)-(8) above. This is a clear
case where a gift horse does need to be
looked at in the mouth since, to mix metaphors ever so slightly, it turns out to be a
Trojan horse.
The class of cases where (seemingly innocuous) transfers can improve the donor's
welfare at the expense of either the direct
recipient or an agent outside of the transfer
process, or both, may then be christened
generically as phenomena involving an Invisible Shakedown.
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